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In the paper we describe genezis of decentralisation and corporatisation of airport sector in the Slovak Republic 
to reveal  circumstances influencing expected decision about Bratislava airport privatisation in 2011. Special 
attention is devoted to unmasking the political umbrella of process in which  - as it is known from other 
privatisation cases worldwide - there is not sufficient space for expert opinions and judgment. We confront 
various attitudes regarding to Bratislava Airport privatisation. We also explain Bratislava Airport privatisation 
in light of  overall  privatisation status of Slovakian airports. In quantitative way we compare Bratislava Airport 
performance with the main competitor Vienna Airport that is very often seen as the key problem of Bratislava 
Airport privatisation with regard to overlapping catchment areas of the airports. Comparison of economic 
performance, as well as airport charges of both airports is made in the paper. The paper does not try to identify 
the best privatisation arrangement for Bratislava Airport as it is primarily focused on documenting perplexity 
and intricacy of privatisation of a small airport that could be a big problem and fiscalized matter.In the paper 
also some considerations are made with regard to some airports competition issues. 
 
Introduction 
Privatisation of airports is an inherent part of changing nature of airports. (Graham, 2008) 
Airports privatisation extends globally, stemming from various motives and following a broad 
portfolio of privatisation schemes. (Tomová, 2011) In spite of different political  (pro-and-
con) attitudes towards airports privatisation present within political circles and among citizens 
in countries, airlines as primary customers of airports do not refuse airports privatisation 
itself. For IATA (2006), whether an airport is in public or private ownership is not the central 
question. ACI (2007) keeps similar attitude and does not advocate any ownership model for 
its members, strenthening that privatisation can bring a spirit of innovation and 
enterpreneurship to airport management and release airport operation from political 
consideration and agenda.  Full privatisation of airport assets is still very rare in the world, so 
in airports privatisation models of  mixed public/private coexistence are predominantly used. 
There is none generally adopted and unambiguous typology of airports privatisation modes, 
although  Cruz – Margues (2011) provide rather simple way how to orient in intricate 
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schemes of public/private partnerships emerging with airports privatisation.  They mention 
institutional and contractual  forms of  public/private partnerships showing how both these 
modes are used in European airports. Participation in ownership or (only) management of 
airports creates a dividing line in this typology. Thus, airport privatisation can be led through 
airport assets sale or through transfer of some ownership powers to private subjects keeping in 
this privatisation form airport assets ownership in public hands. The latter form is represented 
by a broad gamut of diverse contracts – management contracts, lease contracts, concessions 
contracts which have different preference in world regions (Tomová, 2009) Various countries  
used various approaches to privatisation of their airports and as any airport is unique social-
economic system with typical distinctive features (Yang, 2011), any cross-airports global 
privatisation manual can not be recommended with regard to ways how to privatise airports. 
Main portfolio of  options for country´s strategic decision about airports privatisation is 
contained in Figure 1 in which we mark airports privatisation strategy changes in turbulancy 
of political changes in the Slovak Republic. 
 
Strategic Portfolio for Airports Privatisation (and Slovakia privatisation strategy evolution)  
Fig. 1 
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Bratislava Airport Privatisation Peripetia 
The Slovak airports passed over typical stages in airports devolution from public governance 
(ICAO, 2006). In 1991 the Slovak Airports Authority was established with some autonomy, 
then airports started to be corporatised. Bratislava Airport, j.s.c. fully in state ownership was 
created in 2004. Bratislava Airport privatisation effort (or non-effort) changes like 
governments in the Slovak Republic change, so privatisation is re-starting or re-stopping fore 
and aft. Some consider Slovakia´s golden years of privatisation came between 1998 and 2006, 
when a liberal attitude prevailed that led to the extensive privatisation of substantial part of 
economy, infrastructures included. (Weston, 2011) In 2006, Košice Airport - the second 
largest airport in the Slovak Republic was privatised at the end of liberal government.  66 % 
of the shares were sold to KSC Holding consisted of Airport Vienna and Reiffeisen 
Zentralbank Gruppe.  After new government came to power in 2006, prepared privatisation of 
Bratislava Airport through assets sale was abonded. And again, new - again liberal -  
government decided to privatise Bratislava Airport through long-term lease with strategic 
private partner that ought to be chosen through transparent international tender. Initially 
designated concession period has been prolonged to motivate investor (now 30-50 years) and 
time for privatisation story has been shortened (now June 2012, however, Ministry of Finance 
requested March, 2012). We deem that any airport privatisation strategy ought to result from 
country´s airports development strategy as primary document for future privatisation 
decisions not regarding which government (and how) is horse-whipping. Absence of such 
development strategy enables to change  strategic decisions in privatisation issues  ad hoc and 
prohibit to evaluate benefits (or disbenefits) of privatisation in future.  According to the actual 
governmental materials, three options were evaluated in the case of Bratislava Airport 
privatisation, assets sale, long-term concession and reciprocal transfer of shares between 
Vienna Airport and Bratislava Airport (sic! with regard to the comment 2). Just shared 
catchment area of Vienna and Bratislava airports2, i.e. a multi-airport system in which airports 
are subject to different regulatory and governmental policy  (Figure 2) gives Bratislava 
Airport privatisation really unique incomparableness against other such systems in Europe, 
like  Berlin, Frankfurt etc. 
 
 
Vienna  Multi-Airport System 
Source: Bonnefoy, 2007 
Fig. 2 
Any (airports) privatisation process is nor easy, neither ideal or impeccable. However, naked 
privatisation effort  and  naked liberal certitute are insufficient for achieving privatisation 
success that ought to be driven not primarily by fiscal aims. We consider Bratislava Airport 
privatisation as very intricate process due to really very specific features that are stemming 
through Vienna-Bratislava coexistence in shared catchment area, both being capital airports. 
Taking into account this intricacy, we think that process of Bratislava Airport privatisation 
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should not be hurried, fiscalized, videlicet  it should be thouroughly and well prepared. Now 
then let us evaluate qualities of govenmental materials that served as a base for Government 
of the Slovak Republic to resolve upon Bratislava Airport privatisation.3 
 
Comments on Governmental Material on Bratislava Airport Privatisation 
The Slovak Republic Government adopted decision on Bratislava Airport privatisation 
pursuant to the material  named as “Development Project of Bratislava Airport“. According to 
our opinion, this document  shows some internal disagreement, data and opinions 
inconsistency, viewiness from old times of directive economy as well as something that is 
more political-economic journalism than carefull economic analysis.4 
Within the material we can find the statement about “ different options of airport ownerships 
and leasing“ which the authors indicate as “airports in majority state/public ownership“, 
airports in private ownership, airports with the share of public and private ownership, and 
airport leasing“ (p.13). It is  really bewildering that the authors do not see in their typology 
that airports in majority state/public  ownerhips fall within airports with the share of public 
and private ownership. The authors continue in this nullity in further part of the text when 
they try “ to describe advantages and disadvantages of the above-mentioned options“ starting 
with “airports in public ownership“ , describing airports in total public ownership as the first 
option. Similar mesiness we can find at the following page (p.14) where the authors describe  
in the form of table “basic characteristics“ of various airports ownership forms stating three 
forms “state/public ownership,  public-private ownership   and private subjects/long-term 
leasing by private subject“. In this ownership forms identification we again find some 
terminology vagueness. Reading the explanation about basic characteristics of these forms we 
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can read within public/private ownership option also “leasing/concession form“. The authors 
this ownership option “public/private ownership“ label synonymously as Public Private 
Partnership so it is not really clear whether they do distinguish  sufficiently or anywise 
between institutional and contractual form of public-private partnerships. “Long-term 
leasing“ mentioned as the third option in the table is  without any doubt one of the forms of 
public-private partnership of contractual type, however, only the second option named 
“public/private ownership“  is indicated by the authors as public private partnership. One can 
only misdoubt that the term public-private partnership for designated long-term lease of  
Bratislava Airport is considered by the government as not very politically comfortable as just 
the Fico´s left-wing government decided to use contractual public-private partnerhips for 
highways construction in Slovakia5 and this was rejected as bad option by contemporary 
right-wing (liberal) government. The authors of the material continue in this terminological 
chaos in the following text by  sudden introducing “management contract, concession and 
financial project of BOT type“ (p.15) into airports privatisation schemes not mentioning some 
of them before in the list of privatisation options. We can again argue that BOT is considered 
to be a concession and concession according to the authors in this list of privatisation options 
is then explained as long-term lease. Indication that all three they are contractual public-
private partnerhips is absolutely missing in the text. But let us  break with  airports 
privatisation termonology and typology and discuss some of ideas and arguments included in 
the material. We shall see how post-socialist reminiscences emerged in the material that tries 
to find capitalist track for the Bratislava Airport development. The authors write that “after 
splitting Czechoslovakia the process of creation and functioning of domestic airline ... did not 
occured and it is still the main problem of Bratislava Airport functioning...“ (p.2) However, 
just in the next sentence the authors introduce the information that „some good project was 
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SkyEurope Airlines that suffered by low purchase power of Slovakians. By contrast, as 
contraproductive we see the existence of Slovak Airlines with state share created on the base 
of state decision. This company deformed market and it has negative influence on 
development of private airlines.“ (p.2) It is really astonishing that low purchase power of 
Slovakians is blamed for market failure of SkyEurope Airlines. This is a typical argument 
symptomatic for socialist period of our country when external factors were generally adopted 
as objective reasoning of all subjective failures and abortions.  Moreover, the banckruptcy of 
SkyEurope Airlines ocurred when Slovak Airlines did not exist, so none deforming influence 
of state airline on private domestic airlines was not  present that time in markets.  We can find 
in the text also  an argument about  “excessively  low prices that were not sufficient to cover 
all operation costs of SkyEurope Airlines“ (p3.) and “some deformity in perception of air 
transport service  value  is further privation of this development when flying public 
accustomed to low prices.“.(p3. and 4.) What a devilry of customers  we could add rather 
ironically... Value and price: interesting twins, however, just market is who is valuing goods 
and services through price in competition. This part of the material really suffers by 
phenomenon that we label as post-socialist reminiscences in which sound knowledge of 
market mechanism and current (market) status of air transportation  is apparently absent. 
Confronting the above-mentioned statement of the authors with strenghts and opportunities  
of the Bratislava Airport described by the authors in SWOT analysis “large, economically 
strong catchment area ...“ and also „strong charter market“ ...“interest in charter flights“ 
(p.11), we must again admit further at least information and ideological controversy of the 
material. 
We cannot agree also with the statement that “low-cost carrier is a regional matter“ (p.10) 
anyway we try to comprehend it within the context. Low-cost carriers develop their activites 
in over-regional scope, they use also primary, not only regional airports. The authors explain 
criteria for low cost carriers airport choice, mainly those of direct financial impacts.  The 
authors with almost ideological impassionedness cry for „cooperation and activities of 
subjects (i.e. regions, municipalities, business entities that have benefits from airport 
activities) ... to attract new destinations ... it is seen only as a role of the airport and its 
management that is absolutely improper looking at the mater... the need for such cooperation 
will raise in future... Airport itself will never have sufficiency of financial sources and other 
capacities for complex development of new lines. Therefore it will be necessary to include all 
subjects benefiting directly or indirectly from air transport so they invested some of their 
resources in development of demanded new lines...  “ (p.9 and 10)  “Weak support of regions 
and municipalities as well as non-active support of tourism organisations“   is also mentioned 
within SWOT analysis of the Bratislava airport (p.11). Regardless of what non-active support 
actually means we seem as very illusory to cry for this type of “direct financial cooperation“  
when designated concession between the current state owner and private concessionare will 
be signed and configuration of relationships of stakeholders will be more complicated as it is 
under public status of both Bratislava Airport ownership and management.  How could active 
(according to the authors direct financial) support of regions, municipalities and business 
subjects  be incorporated in contract between the contractual partners – state as the airport 
owner and private concessionare? Moreover, taking into account problems with public 
finance in all levels within country, one can hardly anticipate that regional public finance 
sources would be at disposal for such type of support. And whether the Bratislava airport 
privatisation itself is not a solution covering both new capital sources needs as well as needs 
of new managerial skills in business airport policy (attractiveness of  the airport included)?  
 As rather naive we apperceive the statement that „besides  cooperation with business and 
non-business entities within the town and the region it will be necessary to create succesful 
domestic carriers... strong dependance of the airport on foreign carriers in this way would be 
limited“ (p.11). It is really deep non-understanding the matter in such situation in which 
operation of the airport is decided to be transfered (we can assume it) to a foreign entity. 
Moreover, the authors state in other part of the material  (p.8) that „for foreign carriers 
without any relation to the Slovak Republic, the Bratislava airport is only one of the 
destinations and destinations to and from Bratislava are operated by these carriers only if  it 
will be profitable.“ They are the same authors which were annoyed by market  deformity due 
to  operation of the state-owned Slovak Airlines in other part of the text...  
Alike we have strong objections against quantitative data contained in the document that are 
unbalanced  from the point of time scale and details6 and visually very inconsistently 
presented. And although any privatisation is particularly political and economic matter, none 
serious analysis of financial-economic performance of the Bratislava airport is done in the 
material, doing with the information that “airport achieves operational profit, in 2009 9,3 mil. 
Eur.“  (p.8) Somewhat smiling is the statement about the advantages of combined ownership 
at the conclusions for the Bratislava Airport privatisation “ the largest advantages are shown 
in costs efficiency, revenues generation and financing of own capital structure“, really 
financing of own capital structure is very interesting terminological innovation that has 
emerged in this material. We could also mention that potential of the airport in cargo  
transportation mentioned in the text is not included in the airport opportunities within SWOT 
analysis, as well as some missing infrastructure (hangars, cargo terminals) mentioned in the 
text again absent in SWOT analysis, so as charges policy7 and overall price payed at the 
Bratislava airport for services (fuel surcharges as an example) mentioned as weakness in the 
text, not included in SWOT of Bratislava airport etc... 
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In further part of the material we can found three SWOT analyses as a base for comparison of  
three considered  privatisation options – assets sale, concession and reciprocal transfer of 
shares between Vienna and Bratislava airports. Again, one cardinal methodological objection 
can be raisen against this methodology. In these three SWOT analyses there are overlapping 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities  and threats mentioned for all three  privatisation options, 
so they must be inevitably weaknesses, threats, strenghts and opportunities of privatisation 
itself, not only those attributable to some concrete privatisation option (development of 
airport, secondary effects of know-how transfer, synergetic  impact on regional 
development...) In our opinion, differential SWOT  analyses approach would be more 
appropriate when distinguishing among privatisation options. Moreover, similar nullity as it 
has been alleged for previous parts of the material labels also SWOT matrices of considered 
privatisation options.  In preferred concession option for privatisation for instance “higher 
influence and control level of state over the airport“ is stated as strength, in weaknesses 
“limited influence over the airport development“   etc. In all three options threats risk of  
Antimonopoly Office decision is mentioned with regard to situation in which Vienna would 
be a winner. However, none serious arguments about competition status of Bratislava Airport 
with Vienna Airport is done here.  
Vienna and Bratislava spatially competing (?) 
Frohlich and Niemeier (2011) try to explain the models of spatial economics and apply them 
on airports with overlapping catchment areas. Following their approach, we can state in line 
with postulates of Hotelling model of spatial competition that Bratislava and Vienna  airports 
are characterised by sufficiently low surface transportation costs, so they can compete with 
each other in price. However, demand substitutability as a function of surface transportation 
costs between airports is not so straightforward in the case of airports, as there are two 
demand  substitutability aspects.  The UK Competition Commission (2008) states that the 
demand for airport services is a derived demand and change in price or quality of airports 
services can affect demand for airports services directly or indirectly.  Directly, as a result of 
substitution by airlines and indirectly, through downstream effects, by affecting airline fares 
and inducing substitution by airline customers. We fully agree with findings of the UK 
Competition Commission (2008) that  both direct and indirect demand substitutability are 
relevant for airports competition assessment. Therefore,  surface transportation costs can 
partially explain (together with price/quality of air transportation service) choice of airlines 
customers (downstream substitutability) in situation of existing product/quality substitutes of 
airlines at competing airports, however, taking into account different time elasticities within 
passengers segments. When explaining this phenomenon, also frequencies of destinations 
ought to be taken into account as providing more frequencies, schedule displacement elements 
in total trip time are decreasing (Belobaba, 2009) that could be relevant choice determinant 
for time sensitive passengers.8 Also irrationale ignorance of surface transportation costs 
(Forsyth, 2003) by some passengers (or some segments of passengers) may play some role in 
substitutability effects in down stream. According to us, quantitative relation of surface 
transportation costs as mentioned before and airport charges per passenger can provide some 
jump-off when considering airport prices and surface transportation costs as elements of 
demand substitutability in down stream. 
As for direct airports subsitutability, i.e. a change in prices by one airport causes airlines to 
switch to competing airport, this issue deserve also attention.9 Existing models of spatial 
competition distinguish various aspects – two centres or one centre spatial competition, 
product differentiation models etc. Bratislava and Vienna is - according to our viewing the 
problem – two centres spatial competition case, however, with fundamentally different 
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9 Frohlich and Niemeier (2011)  in our opinion do not distinguish  sufficiently direct and indirect  demand 
substitutabilities. 
negotiation positions of competing airports towards airlines, Vienna more price – maker and 
Bratislava more price - taker with all consequencies resulting from it. Vienna is a primary 
centre of the region and Bratislava  a secondary one, i.e. two centres unbalanced gravitational 
case,  accordingly switching airlines demand from Vienna to Bratislava through competition 
(price/quality) clashes against  economies of scale and economies of scope and consequent 
costs limits and depends on airlines sensitivity towards airport price.  Moreover, existing 
spatial competition models prove that if demand substitutability between airports is very low, 
even two independent firms with different owners could charge higher prices. This is just also 
a case of two centres competition with the same welfare effect whether under separate or join 
ownership. (Frohlich and Niemeier, 2011). Thereto,Vienna prices are regulated by price cap  
dual till system and this fact is nor considered neither discussed within existing modelling 
literature till now with regard to competition and welfare issues. If Vienna will obtain 
concession for operation of Bratislava, two regulatory systems will met, discretionary 
regulation of Vienna and contractual one of Bratislava  as concession will  probably contain 
some regulatory provisions relating to airport prices. Another fact that is interesting for 
modelling of airport spatial competition is an existence of restrictions in  airport  capacity. 
Consequently, spill over effect of incresing demand to neighbouring airport under join 
ownership/management versus increasing of existing capacity of dominant airport within 
catchment area keeping separate ownership/management of two competing airports could be 
another challenge for modelling approach in this field. Also multiproduct and multisided 
platforms of airports ought to be more considered in models of airports spatial competition. 
Conclusion 
Small airport, big problem, insufficient analyses, absence of  development strategy, 
fiscalization and acceleration  – these characteristics are – according to our opinion – 
attributes of prepared Bratislava Airport privatisation. 10 Summarizing, Vienna and Bratislava 
airports according us now compete in down stream in very limited  air transport markets and 
market segments, negotation position of airports  towards airlines is fundamentally different, 
direct substitutability of airports by airlines is highly influenced also by operational 
characteristics of both airports as well as some inbuilt demand stabilizers in Vienna resulted 
from two centres system that cannot be so easily overcome by  “a slight change in price“  as it 
is hypothesized in spatial competition models. Direct airports substitutability is according to 
us rather low. When judging Vienna as possible future concessionaire of Bratislava airport, all 
these and in all conscience other factors ought to be taken into consideration during 
privatisation process. Unfortunatly, just they absent in Bratislava Airport privatisation 
materials. The dominant importance is given to fiscal impacts and consequence of 
privatisation, therefore privatisation models are only analysed (with all objections we have 
raisen) and market/competition/welfare impacts of potential joint – operation airports system 
versus single airports operation are not taken absolutely into account  through consideration of  
gains and costs of such options (Forsyth et al., 2010). So as grid Vienna – Bratislava – Košice 
is another, over – regional competition aspect of potential “soft  acquisition of Bratislava 
airport operation“ by Vienna that calls for research attention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 However, it can be something like kingking clutter, sly negotiation tactics against future concessionare. 
References 
ACI POSITION BRIEF 2007 – Airport Privatisation. 
ANNUAL REPORTS OF BRATISLAVA AIRPORT 2004-2009 (and airport charages 
information 2010). 
ANNUAL REPORTS OF VIENNA AIRPORT 2004 – 2009 (and airport charages 
information 2010). 
BADANIK, B. (2008) Airlines' point of view as a new approach to measuring quality of 
service at airports, In: ICAS 2008: 26th Congress of the International Council of the 
Aeronautical Sciences including the 8th AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration, and 
Operations, ISBN 0-9533991-9-2 
BELOBABA, P.P. (2009) Overview of Airline Economics Marketsand Demand. In: The 
Global Airline Industry. ISBN 978-0-470-74077-4 
BONNEFOY, P.A. (2007) Role of the Privatisation of Airports in the Dynamics of Mulit-
Airport Systems. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. www.scribd.com/doc/.../Bonnefoy-
Airport-Privatization-Paper 
COMPETION COMMISSION UK (2008) BAA Airports. Provisional Findings Report 2008. 
Appendix 3.1. Market Definition. 
 www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/.../airports/.../prov_find_3_1.pdf. 
CRUZ,C.O. – MARQUES, R.C. (2011) Contribution to the study of PPP arrangements in 
airport development, management and operation. In: Transport Policy - Volume 18. 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT OF BRATISLAVA AIRPORT (2011) 
http://www.rokovania.sk/File.aspx/ViewDocumentHtml/Mater-Dokum-
129925?prefixFile=m_ 
DECISION OF ANTIMONOPOLY AGENCY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC NO. 
2006/FH/3/1/105 
FORSYTH, P. (2003) Competition between Major and Secondary Airports – Implications ofr 
Pricing, Regulation and Welfare.  GARS. 
 
FORSYTH, P. et al. (2010) Airport Competition: The European Experience. ISBN 978-0-
7546-9484-7 
 
FRUHLICH, K. – NIEMEIER, H.M. (2011) The importance of spatial economics for 
assessing airport competition. In: Journal of Air Transport Management 17. 
GRAHAM, A. (2008) Managing Airport - An International Perspective. Elsevier Ltd. 
IATA (2006) IATA Economics briefing – Airport Privatisation 
ICAO (2006) Airports Economic Manual, document 9562, second edition. 
TOMOVÁ, A. (2009) PPP Projects and Airports: Experience and State in World Regions. 
www.wip.tu-berlin.de/typo3/fileadmin/.../2009/.../17b_tomova_paper.pdf 
TOMOVÁ, A. (2011) Transnationalized Airports: New Phenomenon or Myth?Presented in 
Moscow, regconf.hse.ru/uploads/f2ec306691c960afc04743cd9f85c08a2f954dd1.doc 
WESTON, J. (2011) Slovakia: Is the privatization train about to re-start?  
www.wiredvc.com/slovakia578-is-the-privatization-train-about-to-re-start/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex A 
Source: Annual Reports of Bratislava and Vienna airports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Passengers 
(millions) 
 
Bratislava 1,3 1, 9 2, 0 2, 2 1,7 
Vienna 15,9 16,9 18,8 19,7 18,1 
Cargo 
(tones) 
Bratislava  3 633 5055 1969 6 961 11 903 
Vienna 234 677 265 778 272 362 267 985 254 006 
Employees Bratislava 535 627 672 693 630 
Vienna 3 500 3 834 4 087 4 266 4 148 
EAT 
(thousands 
EUR) 
Bratislava - 5 715 670 762 814 -2 685 
Vienna 74 300 76 800 87 700 91 100 73 400 
EBITDA 
(thousands 
EUR) 
Bratislava 8 651 8 285 9 307 14 210 9 272 
Vienna 149 700 169 600 191 000 201 900  166 500 
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Comparison of revenues from airport charges in EUR 
 Bratislava and Vienna (2010)/ATR 72-500 
Fig.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison of  revenues from airport charges in EUR  
Bratislava and Vienna (2010)/Boeing 737-800 
Fig. 4 
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